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ABSTRACT: Hedonistic utilitarianism – the theory that one should act so as to maximize 
pleasure and minimize pain – has not attracted much interest from feminist scholars. In this 
article, however, it is claimed that many policies advocated by feminists could also reasonably 
be advocated by hedonists. Thus, hedonism can normally not be called a non-feminist (much 
less an anti-feminist) moral theory, and this is not surprising since hedonism avoids many of the 
critical points that have been directed at other "malestream" theories. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Hedonistic utilitarianism (from now on I will simply refer to it as "hedonism") is the 
ethical position that pleasure is the only thing that is good in itself (non-instrumentally 
good) and that pain is the only thing that is bad in itself (non-instrumentally bad), and 
that one should always act so as to maximize the pleasure (and minimize the pain) of 
everyone affected by our actions. The locus classicus of hedonism is the opening chapters 
of Jeremy Bentham's An Introduction to the Principles of  Morals and Legislation ([1789] 1907). 
Although this position was once popular among moral philosophers, it seems nowadays 
to be very much a minority position. And it seems to be even less popular among 
feminist scholars and thinkers. But the reason for the non-endorsement of hedonism 
among feminists is mainly because they seem to have been uninterested in studying it 
very much in the first place, and on the rare occasions when utilitarianism is discussed 
it is not in its hedonistic form, but rather some ‘economistic’ version of preference 
utilitarianism, which some people connect with neoclassical economics or 
‘neoliberalism’. Tännsjö (1998: 159) speculates that the reason for this lack of interest, 
and for the frequent misunderstandings about hedonism among feminists, may be that 
utilitarianism has not been in fashion during the time that modern feminist theories 
were developed (roughly since the beginning of the 1970s). More popular politico-
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philosophical theories, like that of John Rawls, have been thoroughly analyzed by 
feminist scholars. 
Are there good reasons to reject hedonism on feminist grounds? Well, that depends 
on what one means by feminism. If feminism is coequal with a substantial ethical 
position (such as ethics of care), then feminism is indeed a rival to the ethical position of 
hedonism; and if the feminist ethical theory simply has better philosophical arguments 
in its favor than hedonism then the latter should be rejected. If feminism entails that 
one must reject deductive "enlightenment thinking", because it is based on a male 
cognitive style, then one must probably reject hedonism too. Even though I do not 
think that hedonism should be rejected on these grounds, I do not intend to argue for 
that in this paper.1 
One could also reject hedonism on the grounds that on the level of application it has 
non-feminist (or maybe even anti-feminist) consequences. This means that no criticism 
is aimed directly at the theory of hedonism. This style of critique is, rather, based on the 
idea that an ethical theory must be rejected if it has certain applications that are 
(intuitively) perceived as bad. However, I believe this is a problematic way of reasoning. 
The foremost purpose of endorsing an ethical theory is to give you a tool to decide 
which actions or policies are good and bad. To decide first that some action or policy is 
good or bad and then reject an ethical theory because it endorses the wrong actions or 
policies, is to get things the wrong way around. An honest ethical reasoner who has 
endorsed some ethical theory must be able to realize that one could previously have 
been wrong about which actions should be done or which policies should be realized. 
Thus, if one wholeheartedly endorses hedonism because one believes it is the most 
defensible ethical theory and then finds out that, when applied, hedonism entails non-
feminist policies, then one should stop being a feminist; just like one should stop lying 
to save innocent people from the Gestapo if one, on philosophical grounds, have been 
convinced that lying is always wrong. All this could, of course, be rejected if one 
believes that ethical theorizing in itself is wrong, and that one should simply decide 
normative questions on a case-by-case basis, aided by immediate intuitions (although I 
don't see how one could coherently argue for that position).2 
                                                          
1 I have addressed common critiques against hedonism in Olsson (2016). 
2 Of course, hedonism is also based on intuition, but it is one foundational intuition, which, so to speak, 
overrules all other intuitions. This way of subordinating other intuitions to one "master" intuition has the 
advantage of always (at least in principle) resolving ethical dilemmas – something which could not be 
accomplished if one has many intuitions of the same "dignity" that tell one to do contradictory things. 
Again, the hedonist (or "hierarchical") way of reasoning could be rejected if one does not believe that the 
purpose of ethics is to resolve ethical dilemmas in a systematic (and falsifiable) way. 
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So even if I do not believe that hedonism can be rejected simply because it has 
non-feminist consequences on the level of application, I will nevertheless make an 
internal analysis of that position, accepting the normative feminist premise as given. 
Thus, the pertinent question is: could it be the case that hedonism entails non-
feminism on the level of application? In a straightforward sense it may seem obvious 
that hedonism cannot be anti-feminist, because the doctrine is based on the idea that 
everyone's pleasure is of equal worth. However, it seems that it would be possible to 
argue that men gain more pleasure from living in a patriarchal system than what 
women lose, and that in a more equal society (from the point of view of gender 
relations) women's gains in pleasure would be quite modest, compared to the increases 
in pain among men. Nevertheless, my argument will be that this is not the case. Many 
policies that are put forward under a feminist banner can also be seen as hedonist 
policies. 
Concretely, I will examine a few visions about what a feminist society or polity 
should look like and assess whether those visions are incompatible with hedonistic 
visions of society or not. That is not a very easy task, since hedonistic politics is a 
question of empirical assessment: does a certain policy as a matter of fact increase the 
sum of pleasure or not? To some degree we can rely on the more and more flourishing 
field of happiness research; but those studies must generally be taken with a grain of 
salt, because they are not usually focused on pleasure per se, but rather self-reported life 
satisfaction or the like. Such retrospective assessments of "global" life satisfaction tend 
to have limited reliability (especially when they are to be used for normative hedonistic 
purposes, as opposed to, for instance, prediction of behavior), compared to more direct 
measurements of pain and pleasure (for instance by letting test subjects fill out 
continuous reports about their state of mind) or qualitative interviews.3 Therefore, one 
must also put one's own judgments about reality in the mix, which might include such 
things as introspection, anecdotal observations and folk psychology. These quasi-
scientific accounts of what would be hedonistically desirable must then be confronted 
with other accounts, and, in the end, it must be up to the reader or listener to assess 
which accounts seem reasonable and in accordance with reality as they perceive it. 
This is especially important to stress in the present context, since my own search 
(admittedly not extremely thorough) for reliable and generalizable studies regarding 
differences in men's and women's (hedonic) happiness have been rather fruitless. 
Regarding the question of how to define feminism, so as to find genuine "feminist" 
texts to refer to, I have taken the easy way out. I simply chose texts whose authors 
                                                          
3 These problems are discussed in Kahneman & Kreuger (2006) and Ponocny et al. (2016). 
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describe themselves as feminists or contribute to publications (journals, anthologies, 
and book series) that are obviously based on feminist perspectives, and whose views 
can be sorted in under commonly accepted conceptions of feminism (as established by, 
for instance, introductory works about feminism). This method (which one might call 
the "textbook method") accommodates the fact that there are different kinds of 
feminism, but it also lets the researcher disregard conceptions that are too unorthodox 
to be of much interest in a general discussion about what is generally meant by "feminist 
politics". 
One more introductory note seems to be in order: I have abstained from discussing 
the political agenda of first-wave feminism, since first-wave demands of equal political 
and legal rights (primarily the right to vote) are relatively uncontroversial today. 
Indeed, those who support those demands (and those demands only) seem reluctant to 
call themselves feminists at all, lest they be mixed up with second- or third-wave 
feminists. Furthermore, it is obvious that first-wave demands are compatible with 
hedonism, since – this is at least my conviction – any substantial moral theory must be 
realized in a setting of democracy and equal formal rights. The following sections will, 
thus, proceed with discussions about contemporary and more controversial issues in 
"applied feminism" in the context of countries that have achieved the goals of first-
wave feminism. Of course, there are other parts of the world where feminist struggles 
still must focus on these basic rights for women, and these struggles we should all take 
an interest in, whether we be hedonists or not. 
MARRIAGE AND FAMILY LIFE 
Among feminists it is common to argue that the institution of marriage is more harmful 
to women than to men, even if we disregard outdated modes of marriage where 
women were like the husband's property and deprived of the civic rights that the 
husband enjoyed. Some critics point out that the difficulty for women to exit from a 
marriage – due to social pressure and economic dependency – facilitates abuse. A 
study, quoted by Elizabeth Brake, found that "90 percent of wives who stayed with 
their husbands following a rape depended on the husband for money, whereas only 24 
percent of those who left faced this financial constraint […] 100 percent of those women 
who were the sole providers for their households at the time of the rape left their 
husbands following the act" (Brake 2012: 115f). The economic dependence that women 
face is mostly due to the division of labor within marriage. If the woman does not work 
at all or only works part time, it is obvious that an economic dependence of the 
husband will arise (this kind of dependence usually falls on married women who have 
children). Besides the risks of physical abuse that this dependence brings with it, there 
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are also psychological drawbacks. The wife is often expected to take a larger share of 
responsibility for the children's needs, the maintenance of the home (including doing 
laundry for the husband etc.), and contacts with the extended family (even if she is 
working full time). It also seems to be the case that things like depression, nervous 
breakdowns, insomnia, low self-esteem is much more common among married than 
unmarried women. But marriage as a social ideal also exerts pressure on unmarried 
women. "The wedding-industrial complex […] fuels women's vulnerability by 
anticipation of marriage by intensifying pressures to marry, and, even worse, obscuring 
the unglamorous side of marriage and its costs". The fueling of this "desire for romantic 
love and marriage may lead women to make disadvantageous life choices" (Ibid: 117f). 
Feminists do, however, disagree about what should be done about traditional 
marriage,4 i.e., whether reform or abolition is the best way forward. Some believe that 
the important thing is to reduce economic dependence within the marriage, while 
others believe that marriage itself has so strong patriarchal roots that reform is not 
really possible. Brake argues (on "liberal feminist" grounds) for something she calls 
"minimal marriage", an institution that "set[s] no principled restrictions on the sex or 
number of spouses and the nature and purpose of their relationships, except that they 
be caring relationships" (Ibid: 2012: 158). 
It seems hard to argue on hedonist grounds against those who argue that the 
institution of marriage needs to be reformed (or even abolished). Two main arguments 
can be made in support of marriage reform: (i) the direct negative physical and 
psychological consequences (mostly for women) that arise from economic 
dependency;5 (ii) the social and psychological consequences of holding out marriage 
(and family life) as the most "natural" or "proper" way of living. The first argument is 
rather straightforward, and it seems hard for a "patriarchal" hedonist to argue that 
men's pleasure in being abusive or controlling far outweigh the pains of women in such 
relationships. Firstly, it is hard to imagine that abusive husbands get much genuine 
pleasure out of their behavior – there are probably other psychological driving forces at 
work than pleasure seeking. Secondly, I do not think I have ever heard anyone make 
that argument, because such a "conservative" stance on marriage is usually part of a 
larger bundle of conservative opinions about society, many of which are clearly not 
compatible with hedonism. 
The second argument (ii) is more abstract, since it is about unrealized potentialities, 
                                                          
4 Keep in mind that what is usually called "traditional" marriage and family life, where the man works 
full-time outside the home and the woman full-time at home, is a relatively recent way of living among 
common people (Barker & Finer 2004: 31). 
5 Of course, one could mitigate the consequences of economic dependency by having a robust welfare 
system, which makes sure that a divorce from an abusive spouse will not cause economic disaster. 
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namely a society where social institutions and norms are less fixed and where people 
are encouraged to seek out their own way in life. I would argue that a great obstacle to 
increasing happiness is that people generally do not reflect much about how human 
existence could be happier. They simply continue living in established ways, because 
the social and psychological costs to go against engrained practices are usually high. 
Perhaps this is especially pertinent in the case of family formation and child rearing. 
For some reason a great majority of women seems to make the same choice in this 
context, namely the choice to let family cohesion and maintenance take precedence 
over other roles. Barring a complete genetic-biological explanation for this, this must, 
at least in part, be due to changeable gender norms (cf. Diduck & O'Donovan 2006: 6). 
Again, the correct long term solution might be to question the assumption that a 
woman should devote more time than a man to child rearing and domestic chores, 
rather than to make the situation less stressful and more economically rewarding. A 
hedonist argument against this must reasonably consist in an assertion that the anxiety 
of having to find one's own way in life is, in reality, rather painful, and that it is better if 
social norms, so to speak, make our big life decisions for us. This question is hard to 
settle by appeal to empirical evidence, but at least it is not obvious that either side is 
correct, so it cannot really be wrong for a hedonist to argue for the non-conservative 
side if that is how she perceives the world. The latter position also has the advantage 
that it takes account of adaptive preferences. Serene Khader defines adaptive 
preferences as "preferences inconsistent with basic flourishing that a person developed 
under conditions nonconducive to basic flourishing and that we expect her to change 
under conditions conducive to basic flourishing". Perhaps Kader is wrong to claim that 
it is "uncontroversial that women's adaptive preferences are part of the reason that 
patriarchal practices persist in the West" (as well as in the "third world") Khader (2011: 
17, 8, emphasis added); but controversial or not, the idea probably contains a lot of 
truth.6 
My own perception is that there are more people suffering from the strictures of 
social norms than from too much freedom, and this is in line with those who believe 
that "[f]eminism proposes ways of knowing and being in which a self is developed – a 
self that is not produced entirely by socialisation" (O'Donovan & Marshall 2006: 101). 
Of course, this does not mean that one should subscribe to an abstract notion of 
autonomy, perceived as a "quality of an independent, isolated, 'atomistic', 
                                                          
6 Although Khader rejects hedonism and endorses another consequentialist theory, namely a form of 
perfectionism (which focuses on basic flourishing), I still believe her theory has many affinities with 
hedonism (at least the kind of hedonism I wish to endorse). And Khader's rejection of hedonism (on p. 50) 
is based on extremely brief comments (unlike the thorough discussion of preferentialist utilitarianism). 
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'unencumbered' individual" (Ibid: 103). Such an understanding of autonomy has rightly 
been criticized by many feminists, and as a hedonist one can agree with this criticism, 
since autonomy by itself cannot have any value unless it has positive consequences. 
Thus, to a hedonist, a type of feminism that claims that "individuals must aim to 
transcend the social and the physical" and that for women, "this means transcending 
female biology and instead entering into public life, engaging in our own projects and 
exploits" (Ibid: 105) cannot be justified unless this "transcendence" is believed to bring 
more pleasure than non-transcendence. I happen to believe that, for many people, 
such transcendence can bring more pleasure than non-transcendence, but I leave for 
the reader to decide whether that is just a sort "intellectualist" (or perhaps existentialist) 
bias, caused by to much introspection. To some very radical feminists this has meant 
that one should, for instance, reject pregnancy and motherhood and that women 
cannot be completely free until human reproduction has become wholly artificial (Ibid: 
105f). A more sensible response would perhaps be that one should reject pregnancy 
and motherhood unless one can achieve this with a partner who is against the 
traditional sexual division of labor within a relationship (of course, the analysis would 
be different for thoroughly "essentialist" feminists). It is unclear, however, what politics 
can achieve to make sure that women choose the right kind of partner.  
THE WELFARE STATE 
Many feminists have defended the welfare state and have resisted "neoliberal" attempts 
to reduce its scope. Nancy Fraser, for instance, has criticized "neoliberalism's marriage 
of convenience with cultural conservatism," which entails that "it is fine for a woman to 
be dependent on her husband because it is private dependence, and because women 
should be married and heterosexual. By contrast, illegitimate dependence is 
dependence on the state, on the public purse." At the same time, Fraser has stressed 
that the welfare state should not just promote women's employment by enabling 
services like day care or support informal care work through state allowances; the state 
must also change gender roles, and induce men to do primary care work – in other 
words, "aim to overcome the gender division of labour, to soften the public-private 
distinction, and to scramble the care-work distinction." She also claims that we "need 
to further broaden the venerable feminist insight that welfare is not a self-enclosed 
topic that can be understood in isolation from major social-structural forces" (Fraser & 
Bedford 2008: 228, 229, 239). What is needed in the future is a "post-industrial" welfare 
state that effectively insures people against uncertainties in a world of less stable 
employment and more diverse families. Fraser proposes five normative principles that 
should lead a feminist reshaping of the welfare state: anti-poverty, anti-exploitation, 
anti-inequality (in income, leisure-time, and respect), anti-marginalization, and anti-
 COSMOS AND HISTORY 416 
androcentrism (Fraser 1994). 
I cannot discuss Fraser's conception of the post-industrial welfare state in detail. 
Suffice it to say that it is, in many respects, compatible with a hedonist conception of 
the welfare state. That a welfare state should reduce poverty and economic inequality 
(and inequality in leisure-time) is fairly obvious from a hedonist perspective. Most 
hedonists agree that an extra dollar to a poor person brings more happiness than an 
extra dollar to a rich person; and if it is the case that women in general are poorer than 
men (or more stressed due to lack of time), the implications of a hedonist politics will 
also have feminist results. The anti-exploitation principle is also in line with hedonism, 
since by exploitation Fraser means potentially harmful dependency on other people. 
Equality of respect, anti-marginalization, and anti-androcentrism have more remote 
consequences when it comes to maximization of pleasure in society, although 
personally I believe that the more "material" bad consequences of gender inequality 
are, in large part, caused by these more "abstract" or cultural factors, so as a hedonist I 
cannot object to a welfare state that addresses these as well. Fraser writes that "[t]he 
trick is to imagine a social world in which citizens' lives integrate wage earning, 
caregiving, community activism, political participation, and involvement in 
associational life of civil society – while also leaving time for some fun" (Fraser 1994: 
613). It is hard to see why this vision could not also be quoted by someone who believes 
that the aim of politics is to maximize pleasure and minimize pain. The same could be 
said about a statement from feminist economists Barker & Feiner (2004: 2) who argue 
that an economic system should (besides "fairness") provide an improved quality of life, 
a concept that "explicitly include […] criteria as leisure, health, education, and the 
conditions of work so that this metric goes far beyond the traditional market basket of 
goods and services as a measure of well-being". They also discuss such things as 
economic security and meaningful work, and they are sympathetic to Fraser's 
"universal caregiver" ideal. 
It is hard to see how a hedonist could argue against some kind of welfare state. It is 
true that many of the classical utilitarians endorsed economic laissez-faire, but most 
modern philosophers (whether they be hedonists or not) think that this endorsement is 
very contingent on the economic situation of the 19th century, and that some of the 
classical utilitarians would probably have endorsed the welfare state if they could have 
predicted how much resources would be available for redistribution in a productive 
economy of the 20th century kind. I am not aware of any contemporary hedonist 
philosopher who argues for a minimal state or the like (but there are preference-
utilitarians who do, i.e., those who believe that the aim of politics is to maximize 
preference satisfaction, sometimes interpreted as revealed through market behavior). 
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EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES 
It is often noticed that there is a gender-based division of labor in society. Before you 
walk into any place of business you can quite well guess whether there will be a 
majority of men or women working there, and what positions in the hierarchy people 
of the respective gender will have. We can always observe "gendered patterns of 
employment," which "are neither natural nor coincidental." Those patterns "reflect 
deeply entrenched social hierarchies based on gender, race, ethnicity, and class" 
(Barker & Feiner 2004: 56). The fact that women more often work part-time, and in 
jobs with lower wages than typically male jobs, leads to the so-called gender wage gap. 
This gap has been slowly closing over time in many countries, but there are great 
disparities between countries. Again, much of this depends on occupational 
segregation, and a typical feminist standpoint is that this segregation "reflects social 
stereotypes about women's roles and abilities" (Ibid: 63). There is also a vertical 
segregation, generally called the glass ceiling, which refers to difficulties for women to 
advance up the corporate ladder. While, for instance, human capital theory would 
explain the gendered division of labor by claiming that men and women simply make 
rational, self-interested decisions regarding what education and line of work is most 
appropriate for them, feminists would typically claim that expectations about proper 
gender roles has a part in making those decisions. This might explain why there are 
few women in some occupations that require fairly small investments in human capital 
(for instance, among carpenters or electricians). When trying to enter such occupations, 
women "are often subject to subtle and not so subtle hints that their presence is 
unwelcome" (Ibid: 70). 
While some governments have tried to address the wage gap problem by outlawing 
wage discrimination, i.e., demanding equal pay for equal work, Barker & Finer point 
out that this does not affect the wage difference between male-dominated and female-
dominated occupations. Affirmative action has enabled more women to enter into 
male-dominated occupations, although men's employment in traditionally female 
occupations has not risen correspondingly. To address the shortcomings of such 
measures some feminists have advocated policies known as pay equity or comparable 
worth policies, which requires employers to evaluate and compare different jobs. Jobs 
are "assigned points that reflect the jobs' required level of education, skills, effort, 
working conditions, and responsibility. They are then ranked according to the number 
of points. […] Implementing pay equity requires that jobs with the same score receive 
the same pay" (Barker & Finer 2004: 73). However, the pay equity movement "has been 
eclipsed by living wage campaigns […], arguing instead that wages should be 
conceived of in terms of how much money people need to live decent lives" (Ibid: 74). 
I see no clear reasons to oppose anti-discriminations laws (equal pay for equal 
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work) or affirmative action on hedonist grounds. But more ambitious attempts to 
micromanage wages appear problematic. Wages are a part of the system of price 
signals that are necessary to allocate resources in an efficient way, which means that 
the possibilities for politicians to decide who should be paid what are limited.7 Even if it 
seems iniquitous that, for instance, maintenance workers should be paid more than 
secretaries, even though they score the same when it comes to comparable worth (as 
described above), their wages must still reflect such things as supply and demand. 
Otherwise resources (which might be tax payers' money) will be wasted – resources 
which could be used in more efficient ways to combat the gender wage gap. Living 
wage policies appear more in line with (economically efficient) hedonism, provided that 
the wages needed to live a decent life are accomplished not by direct wage controls, but 
by a state unemployment insurance (perhaps in the form of a basic income) which sets 
a de facto floor for wages. Although feminists and hedonists alike can endorse a large 
welfare state, one must be frank about the limited possibilities of closing the gender 
wage gap by the aid of politics alone. To a large extent the fight seems to be a cultural 
one, won by increased feminist awareness among the public, reflected in life choices.8 
Furthermore, a policy that aims to raise the wages of traditionally female occupations 
does not really question the gendered division of labor in itself, which I believe must be 
the ultimate aim of feminism. 
CRIMINAL LAW 
Roughly in the 1970s feminists began to point to gender biases in criminal law, noting, 
for instance, that "while rape was a widespread social phenomenon and an important 
element in patriarchal power, criminal law did little to protect women against one of 
the most invasive physical and psychological violations of their being" (Nicolson 2000a: 
1). Later, issues that had no obvious connection to sex (like rape and prostitution) began 
to be discussed. Law that is supposed to be gender-neutral might have different 
consequences in practice for women and men. For instance, when it comes to domestic 
violence "[f]eminists began to realise that, not only did women faced with domestic 
                                                          
7 This is not a concession to some form of "neoliberalism" or the like. Every society, even one with a large 
welfare state, needs prices established by supply and demand to allocate resources. This means that 
although you can have large sections of society planned by politics, an economy cannot be totally 
planned. Even a country like the Soviet Union needed some market prices established by the world 
economy (or the black market) to function. 
8 An interesting example of the limits of political means is the system of parental leave in Sweden. 
Although economic incentives have made it very feasible for fathers to take half of the parental leave 
period, they still stay at home with children much less than mothers. 
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violence gain little from a resort to criminal law, but that, when battered women 
themselves used violence in a desperate attempt to escape years of violence, fear, 
humiliation and degradation, they found it difficult to use criminal law defences which 
were based on paradigmatic male responses to violence" (Ibid: 2; see further 
McColgan 2000).  
There are few cases of direct discrimination in the law today, i.e., where criminal 
law rules overtly distinguish between male and female offenders or victims. But informal 
discrimination is more frequent. For example, women are less likely to be suspected of 
being criminals than men and are more leniently treated by the police on arrest (for 
instance, in cases of shoplifting) – at least if they are "respectable" women; prostitutes, 
lesbians or political activists tend to be treated harsher (Keenan 2000: 37-44). There is 
also indirect discrimination, whereby the assumptions of the law create different 
practical consequences for different genders. There is, for instance, the accusation that 
"when applying the 'reasonable person' test, the law will tend to have male standards of 
behaviour in mind, […] making it difficult for women to establish the reasonableness 
of their behaviour" (Nicolson 2000a: 10f). In practice, this has – at least in the past – 
rendered it more difficult for women to use the provocation defense to reduce their 
sentence, since while women generally have felt provoked by different things, the 
typical male perception of provocation has been enshrined in the law. 
Pat Carlen (2000: 72) notes that during the 1990s more and more women were 
incarcerated and that "there appears to be a consensus amongst informed 
commentators that the steep increases in the numbers of women imprisoned […] can 
arguably be explained by the increased numbers of women in economic need […] and 
by the increased punitiveness of the criminal justice system towards female offenders in 
general and women from ethnic minority groups in particular". Carlen goes on to 
claim that such punitiveness is hard to justify, both in terms of safety and cost. Women's 
crimes tend to be the results of misfortunes associated with poverty and damaged 
childhoods or of psychiatric conditions. Furthermore, "incalculable costs are annually 
incurred as thousands of children under 16 are made vulnerable to severe emotional, 
psychological and material deprivation while their mothers are in prison" (Ibid: 73). In 
order to reduce the number of women in prison (and, incidentally, also the number of 
men) Carlen calls for a new approach to sentencing. She does not think that women 
qua women should be sentenced differently than men, but, rather, that sentencing 
should be based on four main criteria: the level of threat to society that the punished 
poses, the shape of the criminal career, additional social sanctions that the punished 
will face, and what social roles the punished play in relation to other people.  
Carlen's argument seems extraordinarily compatible with a hedonist outlook, since 
the latter takes no account about abstract notions of criminal justice (or retribution). 
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The only important thing is the consequences (in terms of pain and pleasure – keeping 
in mind that the pain of the punished is a part of the calculus) for society. Opening up 
sentencing to additional criteria that seem to have nothing to do with the crime itself is 
wholly compatible with hedonism. If it were possible all punishments should be meted 
out by all-knowing judges who could assess the felicific consequences of each separate 
sentence. But since such judges do not exist, certain guidelines (democratically decided) 
are necessary, and those guidelines might very well open up for the sorts of 
considerations discussed by Carlen. It seems very reasonable to assume that a hedonist 
policy towards crime would indeed reduce the number of women in prison.  
The "postmodernist turn" in feminism led to a turning away from the issues 
discussed above and towards a focus on gender construction and how the law "helps 
construct stereotypical and frequently harmful notions of masculinity and femininity". 
The gender constructions built into the law reinforces social conceptions of appropriate 
gender behavior and "filters through to general public knowledge, via the media and 
various forms of popular culture" This, in turn, may help "shape the thoughts and 
actions of women and men, if not construct their very beings" (Nicolson 2000a: 14). If 
this perspective is adopted feminist lawyers face a dilemma: should they plead that the 
law does not take equal account of women's particular problems and circumstances, 
and thus confirm that men and women are two clear categories of person with their 
own distinct traits, or should they seek to combat the stereotypes and presumptions 
about gender roles about men and women on which the law is based? There are, for 
instance, certain potential criminal defenses (such as being under the influence of 
premenstrual syndrome or battered woman syndrome), which may "reinforce notions 
of female inferiority, passivity and weakness" (Nicolson 2000b: 170).  
This seems to be a general dilemma for feminist politics. Should one simply accept 
that women have certain roles in society (i.e., a sort of "essentialism") and strive to 
make those roles as rewarding and respectable as male roles (for instance by raising 
wages in traditional female occupations) or should one try to change the culture by, for 
instance, encouraging children to seek paths in life that do not confirm traditional 
gender roles? The answer to this question depends on the degree to which one believes 
gender roles are socially constructed or, conversely, rooted in biological facts; and this 
is a question about which hedonists can have different opinions. Since hedonism does 
not rule out economic redistribution between groups or changes in criminal law to 
favor certain groups over others, policies that favor women (never mind if they act in 
ways that follow stereotypical conceptions about men and women) over men cannot be 
ruled out either. If it is the case that the present system disfavors women when it comes 
to happiness then such policies should be encouraged. But if it is the case that 
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happiness can be raised more (at least in the long run) by combatting the stereotypes 
that make people conform to traditional gender roles (including criminal behavior) 
then the hedonist cannot be opposed to such feminist policies either. 
PROSTITUTION AND PORNOGRAPHY 
Feminists are divided on the questions of prostitution and pornography, regarding, for 
instance, whether or to what degree these activities should be regulated or 
criminalized. When it comes to prostitution, feminists have generally focused on harms 
to prostitutes themselves or the impact the existence of prostitution has on women in 
general. The first group points, for instance, to the numbers of prostitutes who have 
suffered physical abuse at the hands of clients and pimps or who incur health or drug 
problems. The second group usually argues that the main problem is not the working 
conditions of prostitutes, but the idea itself that sex can by bought and sold like other 
commodities. The working conditions of prostitutes could theoretically be improved, 
but that does not alter the fact that the "choice" (it can hardly be seen as a genuine 
choice at all) to be a prostitute is made in the context of oppression and domination. 
According to Carole Pateman, prostitution is "the public recognition of men as sexual 
masters," and a similar position has been held by Catharine MacKinnon. Others have 
claimed that if sex is commodified, the meaning of the uncommodified version of sex 
(based on freely chosen love) will be distorted and damaged. As for political practice, 
the disagreement among feminists regarding the nature of prostitution means that one 
can find proponents for legalization (with regulation and control by the state), 
intensified prosecution, and decriminalization (Childs 2000: 205, 221-227). 
There is, then (like in most policy areas), no one feminist position on prostitution, 
except perhaps that prostitution as it exists today is problematic and that if prostitution 
is to be illegal it is not the prostitutes that should be punished (the position described 
above as "intensified prosecution" is, rather, directed at pimps and johns). The position 
that existing forms of prostitution is problematic is something than a hedonist can easily 
agree to. Prostitution brings much suffering with it, mostly due to the fact that people 
are driven into it by economic necessity; and if someone were to argue that this is 
outweighed by the pleasure that the johns receive, the burden of proof must certainly 
lay on him or her. Common sense seems to indicate that the a few moments of sexual 
satisfaction cannot compensate the constant loss of life quality of the prostitute. Besides, 
is it really the case that sex buyers are generally much happier people than everyone 
else? Anyway, there must be some (probably very few) people who would prefer being a 
prostitute before other available occupations, provided that it is well paid and takes 
place in a safe environment. The best way to make sure that only those people choose 
to become prostitutes seems to be to make sure that no one has to choose it due to 
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economic necessity, i.e., to provide economic security to all citizens (on the level that 
one's society can afford). Providing universal economic security seems to be a better 
remedy than an all out prohibition on prostitution, since it "is widely believed to 
exacerbate its harms, especially in the United States. It contributes significantly to the 
hardships of prostitutes because it places them outside of legal protection, making them 
extremely vulnerable to predators who would exploit their relative powerlessness" 
(Anderson 2002: 749).9 
The circumstances of production of pornography has many similarities to 
prostitution, and as a moral issue the same logic as above applies, namely that the 
suffering that occur in these circumstances (see Waltman 2014, chap. 2 for a description 
of this physical and psychological suffering) can be reduced a great deal (but not 
entirely) if no one is forced by economic necessity to participate in it. Indeed, empirical 
research has shown that poverty or "financial need" is the most frequently cited reason 
for entering into the industry. Many prostitutes and performers in pornography have 
also had troubled childhoods, including sexual abuse and homelessness (Ibid.). These 
harms should, of course, also be pertinent for a hedonist. But there are further 
dimensions to pornography, which do not apply to the same degree to prostitution. 
Many feminists have argued that pornography – at least the "violent" kind – 
contributes to the prevalence of rape and abuse of women (and perhaps also of 
children) (Keith 2001: 123). For the hedonist, the important thing will be to find out 
whether this causal relationship actually exists or not. The jury might still to be out on 
this question, so it would not be surprising if hedonists disagree among themselves 
regarding it (just as feminists disagree among themselves).10 Nevertheless, it is hard to 
argue that a ban (or severe restrictions) on pornography11 would cause more pain than 
universal and unconditional toleration of it; although one could, of course, think of 
alternative futures where this argument would be weakened – for instance, if 
                                                          
9 In Sweden, the prevalence of prostitution seems to have remained more or less constant since the 
criminalization of sex purchases in 1999, although initial contacts between sellers and buyers do not take 
place directly on the street as much as before (nowadays the Internet is the primary method of contact). 
Furthermore, a majority of the prostitutes are non-Swedes, staying temporarily in the country, which 
underscores the importance of access to the welfare system to reduce the prevalence of prostitution (Mujaj 
& Netscher 2015). 
10 Waltman (2014: chap. 3) presents extensive research supporting the position that the typical forms of 
pornography causes gender-based violence. 
11 I assume that most anti-pornography feminists would not subject "nonsexist erotica" to the same 
restrictions (cf. Scoccia 1996: 778). It should also be added that I personally think that pornography is not 
(unless it is entirely written) covered by the democratic right of expression, since pictures are not necessary 
to discuss politics and criticize the government. Therefore, pornography is a legitimate target for state 
regulation if there are good reasons to regulate it (cf. Gastil 1976: 233f). 
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psychological and sociological research were to show that we have grossly 
underestimated the pleasure that people get from watching pornography or 
overestimated the pain the befalls those who participate in the production of 
pornography. According to hedonism, no actions or activities are absolutely good or 
bad in themselves – it all depends on our empirical assessments of the relevant 
contexts. Naturally, such assessments can change when new information comes along. 
CONCLUSIONS 
My aim with this article has been fairly modest. I have tentatively argued that a politics 
based on hedonism cannot reasonably be conceived as anti-feminist, and probably not 
non-feminist either (if one can conceive of such a "neutral" position). Indeed, there are 
many similarities between the hedonist viewpoint and many forms of feminist theory. 
Feminists often criticize different political philosophies for being focused on context-
independent abstract rules of justice. Hedonism, however, is all about empirical 
context, and there are no absolute rules that must always be followed (other than that 
you should act to maximize pleasure and minimize pain), and there is no principled 
aversion to blending the "personal" and the "political". If a group in society appears to 
have less chances of leading a happy life than other groups then the hedonist must 
consider that fact seriously. If women, who make up half the population on this earth, 
generally face larger risks of suffering in life than men, then the hedonist must lean in a 
feminist direction. What this feminism will look like will differ depending on one's 
theory of gender (do, for instance, men find pleasure in fundamentally different ways 
than women?), but no particular theory of gender is assumed in hedonism. 
Now there are different ways of doing feminist politics, and in this article I have 
looked at a few concrete proposals from feminist thinkers. Many of those policy 
proposals might well be endorsed by hedonists. The only clear objection I made was 
regarding suggestions that lean too much toward extensive state regulation of wages, 
since there are limits to what economic planning (and especially price controls) can 
achieve (although the defense of a robust – and, of course, gender-aware – welfare state 
is consistent with both hedonism and most forms of feminism). In the end, political and 
economic means must be combined with social and cultural means if one wants to 
achieve a society where gender does not to a large degree predetermine where one will 
end up in life. 
 
"Mikael Olsson" <jmikaelolsson@gmail.com> 
 COSMOS AND HISTORY 424 
 
REFERENCES  
Anderson, Scott A. (2002) "Prostitution and Sexual Autonomy: Making Sense of the 
Prohibition of Prostitution", Ethics, vol. 112, no. 4. 
Barker, Drucilla K. & Feiner, Susan F. (2004) Liberating Economics. Feminist Perspectives on 
Families, Work, and Globalization, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press. 
Bentham, Jeremy (1907) An Introduction to the Principles of  Morals and Legislation, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 
Brake, Elizabeth (2012) Minimizing Marriage. Marriage, Morality, and the Law, Oxford 
University Press. 
Carlen, Pat (2000) "Against the Politics of Sex Discrimination: For the Politics of 
Difference and a Women-Wise Approach to Sentencing", in Nicolson & 
Bibbings (eds.). 
Childs, Mary (2000) "Commercial Sex and Criminal Law", in Nicolson & Bibbings 
(eds.). 
Diduck, Alison & O'Donovan, Katherine (2006) "Feminism and Families: Plus Ça 
Change?", in Diduck & O'Donovan (eds.). 
Diduck, Alison & O'Donovan, Katherine (eds.) (2006) Feminist Perspectives on Family Law, 
Abingdon: Routledge-Cavendish. 
Fraser, Nancy (1994) "After the Family Wage: Gender Equity and the Welfare State", 
Political Theory, vol. 22, no. 4. 
Fraser, Nancy & Bedford, Kate (2008) "Social rights and gender justice in the 
neoliberal moment. A conversation about welfare and transnational politics", 
Feminist Theory, vol. 9, no. 2. 
Gastil, Raymond D. (1976) "The Moral Right of the Majority to Restrict Obscenity 
and Pornography Through Law", Ethics, vol. 86, no. 3. 
Kahneman, Daniel & Krueger, Alan B. (2006) "Developments in the Measurement of 
Subjective Well-Being", The Journal of  Economic Perspectives, vol. 20, no. 1. 
Keenan, Caroline (2000) "The Same Old Story: Examining Women's Involvement in 
the Initial Stages of the Criminal Justice System", in Nicolson & Bibbings 
(eds.). 
Keith, Heather E. (2001) "Pornography Contextualized: A Test Case for a Feminist-
Pragmatist Ethics", The Journal of  Speculative Philosophy, vol. 15, no. 2. 
Khader, Serene J. (2011) Adaptive Preferences and Women's Empowerment, Oxford University 
Press. 
McColgan, Aileen (2000) "General Defences", in Nicolson & Bibbings (eds.). 
 MIKAEL OLSSON 425 
Mujaj, Endrit & Netscher, Amanda (2015) Prostitutionen i Sverige 2014. En 
omfattningskartläggning, Länsstyrelsen Stockholm, Rapport 2015:10. 
Nicolson, Donald (2000a) "Criminal Law and Feminism", in Nicolson & Bibbings 
(eds.). 
Nicolson, Donald (2000b) "What the Law Giveth, it also Taketh Away: Female-Specific 
Defences to Criminal Liability", in Nicolson & Bibbings (eds.). 
Nicolson, Donald & Bibbings, Lois (eds.) (2000) Feminist Perspectives on Criminal Law, 
London: Cavendish Publ. Ltd. 
O'Donovan, Katherine & Marshall, Jill (2006) "After Birth: Decisions about Becoming 
a Mother", in Diduck & O'Donovan (eds.). 
Olsson, J. Mikael (2016) Hedonismen och dess kritiker, Stockholm: Café 60 media. 
Ponocny, I et al. (2016) "Are Most People Happy? Exploring the Meaning of Subjective 
Well-Being Ratings", Journal of  Happiness Studies, vol. 17. 
Scoccia, Danny (1996) "Can Liberals Support a Ban on Violent Pornography?", Ethics, 
vol. 106, no. 4. 
Tännsjö, Torbjörn (1998) Hedonistic Utilitarianism, Edinburgh University Press. 
Waltman, Max (2014) The Politics of  Legal Challenges to Pornography. Canada, Sweden, and the 
United States, Stockholm Studies in Politics 160 (Department of Political 
Science, Stockholm University). 
 
